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How WE GOT THE COMMERCIAL
SPEECH DOCTRINE:
AN ORIGINALIST'S RECOLLECTIONS
Alan B. Morrisont
The commercial speech doctrine is today a staple of First
Amendment jurisprudence, but it was not always so. Until the
mid-1970s, "purely commercial advertising" was considered out-
side the scope of the First Amendment, and hence entitled to no
protection.' That changed, quite abruptly, with the Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council2 case in
1976, and the doctrine took on an identity and a four-part test of its
own in 1980 with the ruling in Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.3 Although there
have been questions raised about whether treating commercial
speech differently from other speech is a sensible idea, and
whether some parts of the Central Hudson test and its application
should be modified,4 as of today, at least, commercial speech is
entitled to substantial First Amendment protection, albeit less than
political, ideological, or artistic speech.
I was asked to write a piece for this Symposium because I had
been counsel of record for Public Citizen, as an amicus curiae, in
Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,5 a case in which the limits of commercial
t Mr. Morrison founded the Public Citizen Litigation Group with Ralph Nader in Febru-
ary 1972 and was its director for most of the time until he left in January 2004. He is currently
an adjunct professor at New York University Law School.
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942) (holding a municipal ordinance
forbidding street distribution of advertising circulars constitutional).
2 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding that "commercial speech" is not wholly outside the pro-
tection of the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
3 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (striking down a ban on promotional advertising by an electric
utility as an impermissible restraint on the First Amendment freedom of speech).
4 See generally David Vladeck, Lessons from a Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsid-
ered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049 (2004) (discussing fundamental changes in the application
of the commercial speech doctrine since Central Hudson was decided).
5 Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (No. 02-575).
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speech were sought to be tested, but in which the Court ultimately
elected not to decide the question, given the very preliminary stage
at which the case was brought to the High Court. This contribu-
tion will not focus on Nike or any of the recent cases, but will in-
stead tell the story of how Virginia Board of Pharmacy, which I
argued for the plaintiffs, became the springboard for the commer-
cial speech doctrine. As such, this essay is more in the way of a
historic memoir, rather than an analysis of Supreme Court opin-
ions, and an attempt to reconcile often conflicting statements, if
not entire opinions. My modest hope is that this history may cause
the courts to think about the doctrine more in terms of why it was
created (and for whose benefit) and less as a mechanical applica-
tion of the four-part test of Central Hudson.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE ORIGINS
The origins of Virginia Board of Pharmacy6 did not involve a
situation in which a client either had been sued or wanted to sue
over the law that forbade the advertising of prescription drug
prices, although eventually there were clients who wanted to chal-
lenge that law. The idea for the case began when I was a law stu-
dent, or perhaps when I was studying for the New York bar exam
in the summer of 1966, when I learned that lawyers were forbidden
from advertising their services, let alone actively soliciting clients
who might be in need of a lawyer for a particular matter. I recall
thinking how unnecessarily restrictive the rule was and how it
greatly advantaged those lawyers who already had clients and who
were probably the ones who wrote the rules to keep the situation
that way. I also remember subsequently realizing how silly the
rule was because I used to see ads in the New York Law Journal, a
publication whose principal subscribers were lawyers, but which
anyone could purchase by paying the cover price, along the fol-
lowing lines: "Dominican Republic [or Nevada] divorce services
available-lawyers only." Although I never called the number
listed, I have no doubt that the person answering the phone would
not have insisted on seeing my bar card before agreeing to help
obtain a divorce at a time when the only grounds for divorce in
New York were adultery.7
6 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
7 During this same time I became aware of another obvious protectionist bar rule: the re-
quirement that one had to be a New York State resident to take the New York bar exam, al-
though after admission a lawyer could move to New Jersey or Connecticut, as did many of the
lawyers in New York City law firms once they became partners and could afford it. Lawyers
with Public Citizen successfully challenged that law in In Re Gordon, 397 N.E.2d 1309 (1979),
and the Supreme Court eventually struck down all similar provisions in Supreme Court v. Piper,
1190 [Vol. 54:4
2004] HOW WE GOT THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE 1191
After a relatively brief stint at a major New York law firm, I
went to the Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York where I was assigned to the Civil Division. I
was fortunate enough to work on a major tax case against a promi-
nent firm, as well as a number of other challenging cases, and as I
began to think about what I would do when I left the office, I
thought I could sell my talents to prospective clients, but knew that
I could not advertise or solicit their business (or at least not
openly). This seemed wrong, both for me and for the prospective
clients who, it seemed, should at least be given a choice among
counsel, which meant somehow they had to find out about me, my
experience, and what I would charge compared to others. Price
competition was permitted; it was just that no one had any way of
finding out that some qualified lawyers charged less than others.
My interest in advertising my own services took a backseat to
a more general interest in increasing the availability and afforda-
bility of legal services when I accepted a job offer in Washington
D.C. from Ralph Nader to start the Litigation Group of Ralph's
newly formed Public Citizen. I was incredibly fortunate to have
Ralph for a boss because he gave me enormous freedom to bring
law reform cases in areas in which I was interested, and one of
these was the legal profession. Quite by chance, within weeks of
starting the job, a federal antitrust case was filed across the river in
Alexandria, Virginia, challenging the minimum fee schedules of
the Virginia State Bar and three local bar associations. Fairly soon
thereafter I was brought in as lead counsel for the plaintiffs in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,8 in which the Supreme Court ruled
three years later that the minimum fee system in Virginia and more
than thirty other states was price-fixing, forbidden by the antitrust
laws. Goldfarb was important because it removed one barrier to
competition, but it did nothing about the information vacuum
caused by the advertising restrictions, which I also planned to at-
tack.
II. THE VIRGINIA BOARD OF PHARMACY CASE
We knew that attacking lawyer advertising rules would be dif-
ficult, not just because they existed in every state, but also because
they were so universally accepted, at least among the elite lawyers
who became federal judges and justices. Fortunately for us, a case
came along that seemed the perfect prelude to a lawyer advertising
challenge. Across the hall from our offices in Dupont Circle, a
470 U.S. 274 (1985).
8 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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group known as Citizen Action, which had a loose Nader affilia-
tion, had discovered that there was an enormous variation in the
prices charged for prescription drugs in Virginia and that the prin-
cipal reason for this was that a Virginia statute prohibited price
advertising, even though there was no law setting the prices at
which drugs could be sold. The group had done a study document-
ing the problem, and it wanted to know if we could do anything
about it. This seemed to be a situation directly comparable to the
lawyer advertising restrictions, but it had several major advantages
as a test case: the information to be conveyed was objective and
verifiable (unlike some aspects of lawyer advertising); access to
the information was obviously very important to consumers, many
of whom were senior citizens on limited budgets; there was no
other way in which the information could be gathered, short of
calling every pharmacy in the area and hoping someone would
quote a price over the phone; and, perhaps most important of all,
the persons who would be passing on the validity of this law would
not be pharmacists, unlike a challenge to lawyer advertising where
the judges would all be lawyers.
That made this a good case, but we needed a legal theory
other than substantive due process. 9 Although I had never done
formal research on the question, I had done some thinking about
the issue when I was in the U.S. Attorney's Office, and several
principals stood out for me as we tried to formulate an approach.
First, these laws all suppressed truthful and useful information,
and at their core they seemed to run directly counter to the First
Amendment. Indeed, as the courts eventually pointed out, citizens
in general may have more interest in getting commercial informa-
tion that was not then protected by the First Amendment, than in
obtaining the kind of information that was traditionally covered.
Second, as a direct corollary of the first point, the interests of the
readers or listeners of commercial speech are important and enti-
tled to protection on their own, even if the state has an interest in
limiting what a commercial speaker might want to say. Or, as the
concept came to be developed, the rationale for limiting commer-
cial speech is that a listener (potential consumer) may be harmed
by it, and in the absence of some identifiable and legitimate state
interest on the consumer side, commercial speech should be al-
lowed to flourish. Third, unleashing commercial speech can have
9 Our complaint did include such a claim, but while our case was pending in the district
court, the Supreme Court rejected that doctrine in a case similar to ours. See N.D. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
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pro-competitive effects, a factor that surely should be considered
in any balancing of interests that might take place.
Despite the 1942 decision in Valentine v. Chrestensen ° find-
ing the commercial speech there to be unprotected by the First
Amendment, the merits of the claim-that a blanket ban on all dis-
semination of truthful information violated the First Amendment-
seemed strong. Nonetheless, there was still another important in-
gredient to the theory, and for that, two recent Supreme Court
cases seemed very helpful. The first of these was Stanley v. Geor-
gia,1 a case in which the Court held that it was unconstitutional to
criminalize the possession of pornography in one's own home,
even though the government could lawfully prohibit its sale. The
decision seemed useful because the Court had looked at the par-
ticular interests of the person claiming the constitutional violation
and did not simply say that, if a sale were unlawful, then posses-
sion of the sold item can also be forbidden without more. 12 The
second case, Kleindienst v. Mandel,13 was even more directly on
point. There, a Belgian communist wanted to come to the United
States to give a lecture, and the Government did not want to let
him for reasons that the plaintiffs contended violated the First
Amendment. The Court held that Professor Mandel, as a non-
citizen who was not physically in the United States, had no cogni-
zable First Amendment rights, but that his audience, all of whom
were in the United States, had standing to assert their First
Amendment rights as potential listeners, and thus the Court
reached the merits.1 4 These cases, and others found during our re-
search, led us to conclude that a challenge to the Virginia law
could be brought on behalf of consumers, who were being de-
prived of valuable information, and that such a challenge might
well receive a more sympathetic reception than if the pharmacists
who wanted to advertise their prices were the plaintiffs.
5
The lead lawyer on the case was my colleague Raymond Bon-
ner, who has since left the law and become a journalist and writer.
Together we drafted the complaint, assembled the evidence,
reached agreement on a stipulation of facts with the defendants,
and prepared the papers to support our summary judgment motion,
'0 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
11 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
12 Id. at 564-68.
13 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
14 Id. at 762.
15 Indeed, an earlier challenge to the Virginia law by pharmacists on due process and
equal protection grounds was unsuccessful. Patterson Drug Co. v. Kingery, 305 F. Supp. 821
(W.D. Va. 1969).
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which he argued before a three judge district court, which in those
days was the means by which constitutional challenges to state
statutes were adjudicated. Several months later, the court unani-
mously agreed with us that the law violated the First Amendment
rights of the consumer group plaintiffs who wanted access to the
price information for prescription drugs.1 6 After some delays, the
state took an appeal directly to the Supreme Court, which agreed
in the spring of 1975 to hear the case in the fall. By that time,
Bonner had left the office, and so it fell to me as his co-counsel to
argue it. In the meantime, however, two developments occurred
that bore on achieving our ultimate goal of striking down the law-
yer advertising prohibitions.
One arose from the work of the Health Research Group at
Public Citizen. Like lawyers, the medical profession had a ban on
doctor advertising of any kind, which made it very difficult for
consumers to find a doctor who specialized in their need, who ac-
cepted their insurance (or Medicaid or Medicare), spoke their lan-
guage, accepted credit cards, and charged what they could afford,
among many other items of information that a person seeking a
doctor might want to know. The Health Group decided to deal
with the problem by creating a directory of doctors in particular
locations, which would be made available to the public. In other
words, if doctors could not advertise, the Health Group would pro-
vide the information instead.
A problem arose after the survey was sent out when both the
State and some local medical societies figured out that this was a
potential end-run on their no advertising rules, even with a con-
sumer group as an intermediary to police the statements made.
Some doctors declined to cooperate on their own, which was their
right to do, just as many doctors and lawyers have chosen not to
advertise long after the ban has been eliminated. But when the
official state body told doctors that they could be disciplined if
they cooperated---even by telling us such mundane facts as where
they went to Medical School and whether they were board-
certified-that was a different matter.
Once again we decided to file a First Amendment case, this
time representing both consumers who wanted the information and
the Health Research Group that wanted to disseminate it.17 The
case had some procedural complexities, and we had some bad luck
with the judges who were assigned to the case, plus defense coun-
16 Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.
Va. 1974).
17 Pub. Citizen v. Comm'n on Med. Discipline, 573 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1978).
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sel who fought us at every step of the way. In the end, we did not
get a decision on the merits, but by the time the case was dis-
missed, the Supreme Court had leap-frogged over the medical pro-
fession's advertising rules, and struck down the sacred cow of the
ban on lawyer advertising. 18
The second development was abortion-related. In January
1973, the Court issued its decision in Roe v. Wade,19 striking down
the various state laws that banned all abortions. Shortly thereafter,
the Court was presented with a petition for a writ of certiorari from
the Virginia Supreme Court involving a newspaper publisher who
had been convicted for running an advertisement in his Virginia
paper that told readers how they could obtain an abortion in New
York, where it was legal, because, when the "crime" was commit-
ted, abortions in Virginia were still completely banned.2° Instead
of accepting the case, the High Court sent it back for further con-
sideration in light of Roe,2 1 a not-so-gentle hint that perhaps the
Virginia court should rethink its decision. The Virginia Supreme
Court was unmoved and reaffirmed its prior ruling, 2 and another
petition was filed, which the Court granted in July 1974.23
It was at this time that the Litigation Group became involved.
We had no particular interest in the abortion issue as such, but the
case seemed to present another opportunity to press the First
Amendment issue from the perspective of those who were being
denied access to important, perhaps even lifesaving, information.
The defendant was being ably represented by the ACLU, but the
focus of that brief was on the editorial freedom of the press and the
rights of the speaker. We decided to file an amicus brief that
would try to direct the Court's attention to the interests of those
who were being denied the information that the ad contained-
precisely the same interests that we were asserting in the Virginia
Board of Pharmacy and doctors' directory cases.
To help me with the brief, I asked a brand new Harvard Law
School graduate, Gerry Spann (who now teaches at Georgetown
Law Center), to do a first draft, relying heavily on our work in the
Virginia Board of Pharmacy case and citing our interest in that
case and the doctor's directory challenge as the reasons for our
Is We also considered including an antitrust claim in the doctors' directory case, but de-
cided against doing so because at least one of the defendants was a state agency, and we be-
lieved, correctly as it turned out, that the antitrust laws would not apply to rules issued by state
agencies or courts. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977).
19 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20 Bigelow v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 909 (1973).
21 Id.
22 Bigelow v. Virginia, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973).
23 Bigelow v. Virginia, 418 U.S. 909 (1974).
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interest in Bigelow. The case was argued in the fall, but months
went by with no decision. In the meantime, we had lost Gold-
farb24-the minimum fee schedule antitrust case-in the Fourth
Circuit, but we had persuaded the Supreme Court, with the De-
partment of Justice supporting us, to hear the case. Goldfarb25 was
argued in March, and quite by chance, the opinions in both it and
Bigelow came down the same day, both adverse to the State of
Virginia. The antitrust ruling-a unanimous decision that mini-
mum fee schedules violated the antitrust laws26-was of no direct
help in the Virginia Board of Pharmacy case, which the Court had
agreed to hear three months earlier. However, Bigelow had exactly
what we had hoped it would contain: a ringing affirmation of the
applicability of the First Amendment to the right of consumers to
gain access to truthful information about a service that was lawful
where it was to be performed. 7 The decision written by Justice
Blackmun did not overrule Valentine, but it was clear that much of
its force was gone since the abortion advertisement in Bigelow was
paid, and not a public service announcement. To be sure, the
Court in Roe had constitutionalized the right to an abortion, but no
one disputed the rights of pharmacists in Virginia or the thirty-four
other states that had similar laws to engage in price competition-
they just could not tell anyone about it. When Goldfarb came
down, I was asked about its possible impact on lawyer advertising
rules, and I said that I thought it would have very little because the
rules were issued by state supreme courts, not bar associations, but
that I thought that Bigelow would likely have a profound effect on
those rules. No one quoted me, and probably no one bothered to
write down what I had said.
Armed with Bigelow and the favorable decision below, Gerry
and I went about writing our brief. The State's brief had been filed
before Bigelow came down, but not before ours was due, and when
we filed it, we paraded Bigelow front and center. Much to our sur-
prise, the State said nothing about Bigelow in its reply, and when
Justice Blackmun asked the State's lawyer at oral argument about
the Bigelow opinion which he had authored, the answer was that it
had no relevance.
I have always done moot courts in preparation for my oral ar-
guments, and as I was preparing for this one, there were two ques-
tions for which I knew I needed answers. The first was expected
24 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
25 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
26 Id. at 791-93.
27 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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to be something like, "If we rule for you in this case, what will
happen to the rules forbidding lawyers from advertising?" The
answer we worked out was something along the lines of "The First
Amendment would apply and the analysis would be the same.
Whether the rules would be sustained would depend on which ones
were being challenged and what rationales the state offered to de-
fend them." If pressed, I was prepared to answer that the blanket
prohibition on all lawyer advertising could not stand, but whether
some more limited restrictions could be upheld would be impossi-
ble to say without much more information than was then available.
As expected, Justice White posed the First Amendment ques-
tion, albeit in a form that I had not anticipated: "Well, Mr. Morri-
son, I suppose your next case will be against the bar's rules on
lawyer advertising?" As happens far more often than most people
realize, the audience broke into laughter, and as I was preparing to
answer, Justice White, quite uncharacteristically, let me off the
hook: "That's OK, you don't have to answer," presumably because
he was pretty sure he thought I would either answer yes, or be eva-
sive, or claim I did not know what our next case would be, or even
whether there would be a next case. I am not sure whether I was
pleased or not to be relieved of answering because I had deter-
mined to say, as we had already acknowledged in our amicus brief
in Bigelow, something to the effect that "no, our next case involves
doctors and the rules forbidding them from supplying truthful in-
formation to a consumer group that wanted to compile a doctor's
directory." But regardless, Justice White's point was clear: this
case would set the stage for a lawyers' advertising case, and the
Court should expect one very soon.28
The second question involved tobacco, and more particularly
laws banning the advertising of cigarettes. Congress had passed
such a law in 1970, although it applied only to radio and television
advertisements. The Court in Red Lion29 rejected a First Amend-
ment challenge to the fairness doctrine on the ground that the air-
ways were limited by physical constraints. Whatever merits that
decision had, it could not justify a ban that applied to newspapers
and magazines, and so I had to prepare another answer. Unlike the
lawyer question that I was almost pleased to have been asked, I did
28 Justice White asked me a similar question about advertising during the Goldfarb oral
argument. I told him that most advertising rules were not issued by State Bars, but if they were,
they would be subject to the same rules that applied to agreements not to advertise in other
businesses. He asked me what rules applied, and I replied that this Court had not passed on
them, and once again he asked me what rules I thought would apply, finally letting go when I
said that I thought any such agreement not to advertise would violate the antitrust laws.
29 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969).
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not look forward to having to respond on tobacco advertising, but
much to my surprise, I was spared having to take a position. Had I
been asked, I was prepared to say a state might be able to defend
such a restriction on the theory that it could discourage use of a
product (or at least take steps to limit efforts to encourage its use)
without having to make it illegal. That answer would have been
safe in this case because no one argued that Virginia was trying to
discourage price competition, although those who studied these
laws and their origins were convinced that the pharmacists, who
did not want price competition and who were the main supporters
of these laws, did want to limit price shopping. However, no one
ever tried to defend these laws in court on that ground, relying in-
stead on purported consumer protective rationales.30
Again, after a long wait, the Court affirmed the decision be-
low, striking down the Virginia law on First Amendment grounds,
holding for the first time that commercial speech was entitled to
some measure of protection under the First Amendment. 31  Al-
though not directly overruling the decision in Valentine that con-
duct which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction"
(as the Court had put it in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Rela-
tions Commission)32 was not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion, it left the rationale virtually in shambles. Justice Blackmun's
opinion, which was joined by everyone except Justice Rehnquist,
bought our argument based on the interests of those who would
receive the information and relied on the evidence that we had
amassed about how elimination of this restriction would help con-
sumers.
33
30 Initially, the Court accepted the rationale that I was prepared to offer, upholding a
Puerto Rican law forbidding the advertising of casinos to locals, but not to outsiders, based in
part on the theory, as then-Justice Rehnquist put it:
It would just as surely be a strange constitutional doctrine which would concede to
the legislature the authority to totally ban a product or activity, but deny to the legis-
lature the authority to forbid the stimulation of demand for the product or activity
through advertising on behalf of those who would profit from such increased de-
mand.
Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986).
Several years later, first in a liquor case, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516
(1996) (striking down a ban on liquor price advertising), and then with cigarettes, Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) (striking down point-of-sale advertising regula-
tions on tobacco products), the Court rejected that rationale as inconsistent with the First
Amendment. Thus, with the benefit of hindsight, my rationale would not have carried the day,
but it almost certainly would have been enough to allow me to escape unscathed and would not
have altered the outcome of the Virginia Board of Pharmacy decision.
31 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976).
32 Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
13 Id. at 753-57 (discussing the benefits to and the rights of receivers of information and
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The Court did not fully accept our approach, which would
have been to give full protection to commercial speech. Instead, it
observed that commercial speech was less likely to be chilled and
hence did not need the full panoply of First Amendment protec-
tions.34 We had not argued that all forms of commercial speech
needed full First Amendment protection, nor had we urged the
Court to take any other intermediate positions, because the State
never truly engaged us on the issue and never argued that our posi-
tion would lead to unacceptable results in other cases. Moreover,
this case did not involve a claim of overbreadth, vagueness, or
prior restraint, areas in which the sweep of First Amendment pro-
tections are often most valuable. Even with the Court's admoni-
tion that commercial speech might have some additional hurdles to
overcome, we saw our victory as one that would surely sustain us
in our doctors' directory case and in the lawyer advertising cases
that we immediately began to plan.
III. THE FIRST WAVE OF LAWYERS' CASES
Once again, outside events intruded, but this time in a way
that moved us off center stage. The doctors' case got bogged
down, and Consumers Union, with whom we had worked on these
issues, filed a lawyers' directory case in Virginia that appeared to
be moving ahead. 35 But the major activity came from Arizona, in a
matter of which we had no inkling, let alone any influence. Two
young lawyers, John Bates and Van O'Steen, decided to do what I
had once contemplated doing-advertise. They did not ask the bar
for permission, nor did they file suit challenging the restrictions in
an effort to get federal court approval in advance. They formed
the low cost legal clinic of Bates & O'Steen, whose constituency
was middle income individuals, and they simply started to adver-
tise their services and their low prices.
To the surprise of no one, the Arizona bar immediately began
disciplinary proceedings against them, which resulted only in a
sanction of a public censure because the Arizona Supreme Court
concluded that the advertising was undertaken in good faith to test
the constitutionality of the advertising rules. 36 The decision came
down in July 1976, just weeks after the Supreme Court decided the
Virginia Board of Pharmacy case. The Arizona attorneys had de-
First Amendment protection).
34 See id. at 771-72 n.24 (discussing some appropriate limitations on commercial speech).
35 That case also became largely moot after Bates v. State Bar, although it eventually went
to the Supreme Court on an issue of attorneys fees. Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 446
U.S. 719, 739 (1980) (vacating award of attorney's fees to Consumers Union).
36 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 358 (1977).
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fended on both First Amendment and antitrust grounds, and on
October 4, 1976, the Court agreed to hear their claims on both is-
sues. In some respects, this was a good test case because the law-
yers were obviously sincere, they were trying to fill an information
void that particularly harmed lower and middle income Americans,
and their ads were plain vanilla, with no claims of special results
of any kind; just the facts about the kinds and costs of legal ser-
vices they were prepared to provide. On the other hand, the chal-
lengers were lawyers, trying to make a buck, and not consumers,
trying to get access to information, or, as in the directory cases,
trying to publish information for the benefit of others. And they
had deliberately flaunted the law, instead of asking for a court to
decide that the Constitution or the antitrust laws allowed them to
make known their services to the public. But at least this was not
a put-up case, and the Court would see the consequences to two
young and seemingly idealistic lawyers if it upheld the rules.
It was not our case, and the timing and the lack of consumers
as challengers were small worries, but we felt we had no choice
but to file an amicus brief in support of Bates and O'Steen. We
joined with Consumers Union and their lawyer, Peter Schuck (now
a professor at Yale Law School), in urging the Court to uphold the
First Amendment claims, but taking no position on the antitrust
issue. Once again, we emphasized the importance of making the
information available to the consuming public and pointed out that
the State bar never claimed that anything in the ads was false, al-
though we recognized that the same level of verifiability that we
had on the prices of prescription drugs was not present here. This
time we had another argument to help us: the Court did not have to
hold that every rule governing lawyer advertising was unconstitu-
tional, but the across-the-board prohibitions relied on here swept in
truthful, valuable information, along with claims by lawyers that
can most charitably be described as puffing, and might well be
misleading, or potentially so. Thus, even though commercial
speech was entitled to less than complete First Amendment protec-
tion, we argued that these broad restrictions could not stand and
the state bars and their Supreme Courts should have to write their
rules with a more nuanced approach to regulating lawyers' adver-
tising.
In June 1977, the Court, in a 5-4 decision with Justice Black-
mun again writing for the majority, set aside the discipline im-
posed against Bates and O'Steen.37 Once again, the focus was on
the importance of the information to the consumer, not on the
37 Id. at 384.
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rights of the lawyers to garner business for themselves, and this
time the breadth of the prohibition was an important basis for the
Court's conclusions.38 Others have and will debate the merits of
the decision and of Chief Justice Burger's impassioned dissent, but
the outcome was clear: the blanket prohibition could no longer
stand, and the organized bar had to go back to the drawing board.
The ink was barely dry on Bates when the Court became en-
tangled once again in First Amendment battles on October 3, 1977,
by accepting for review two cases involving lawyer solicitations.
39
In contrast to advertising, which is not directed at a specific client,
solicitation involves what lawyers are allowed to say in order to
persuade a client to engage that lawyer for a particular matter, and
in the eyes of many in the bar, it is far more pernicious than adver-
tising. The two cases arose out of disciplinary proceedings in
Ohio and South Carolina, with facts and visceral appeal (or revul-
sion) at opposite ends of the spectrum. Despite the unsavory con-
duct of one of the lawyers, we felt we had no choice but to file an
amicus brief defending them both, a task that fell to Gerry Spann
and me.40
The facts of the Ohio case could not have been worse. A
young woman, who was injured in a car accident with an unin-
sured motorist, was solicited by attorney Ohralik while she was
still in traction in the hospital.41 She tried to withdraw from the
representation, to which she had orally consented, and her lawyer
objected, relying on a secretly taped in-hospital interview to estab-
lish the validity of the agreement. Ohralik also solicited the pas-
senger in her car to be his client, in what was a probable conflict of
interest because the only likely source of funds was a $12,500 un-
insured motorists provision in the driver's policy, which would
have to be divided between the driver and the passenger. Both cli-
ents thereafter filed complaints with the bar, which brought
charges against Ohralik, whom they had discharged by then.
" id. at 368-82.
39 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978).
40 During this general time period, I was invited to give a speech at a Tennessee Bar meet-
ing, which I entitled 'Tfhe Joy of Solicitation." My point was that if one believed in the free
enterprise system, and that consumers should have a choice of counsel, and that more informa-
tion was better than less, then solicitation, which involved communications from a lawyer about
a specific legal need that he knew the consumer had, was more valuable than general advertising
and should be entitled to greater First Amendment protection. I did not really believe that so-
licitation should be more protected, but I did believe that it was as protected as the advertise-
ments in Bates. Not surprisingly, my audience did not agree with my approach, to the point
where one attendee remarked to the effect that "I was a very brave man to come down here and
say these things in public before a gathering of lawyers."
41 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 450.
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Ohralik responded by suing both former clients for breach of con-
tract. In the bar proceedings, his main defense was that he had a
First Amendment right to solicit the clients. In our brief, we ar-
gued that the bar had relied on a plainly overbroad rule that for-
bade all solicitation, which, we contended after Bates, was over-
broad and unconstitutional for that reason. Without passing on
whether all lawyer solicitation rules were valid, the opinion by
Justice Powell upheld the discipline, ruling that, as applied to these
facts, the State could legitimately sanction the lawyer for his in-
person solicitation, of a vulnerable person, for purely economic
42gain.
The other case, In re Primus, involved a lawyer who worked
for the ACLU in South Carolina. Indigent women were being
threatened with sterilization as a condition of receiving Medicaid,
and Ms. Primus met with them and provided information about
their legal rights, but did not solicit any of them as clients. Subse-
quently she learned that the ACLU was willing to take on their
cases, and so she wrote to offer the women free legal assistance.
This offer came squarely within what the South Carolina bar offi-
cials thought was solicitation, and so they brought charges against
her. She too defended on First Amendment grounds.
We at Public Citizen had a particular interest in assisting Ms.
Primus because our lawyers had frequently solicited clients, both
orally and in writing, and we had believed that the First Amend-
ment rights of Public Citizen to engage in such activities shielded
our lawyers. Thus, the portion of our amicus brief devoted to the
Primus case focused on the pro-bono nature of the representation,
the fact that the solicitation was in writing, that there was no argu-
able coercion, and that the lawsuits were being brought to advance
the goals of the ACLU, as well as to help the women who would
otherwise be without counsel. Justice Powell also wrote the Pri-
mus opinion, holding that, largely for the reasons we had urged,
she could not be disciplined."a Taken together, the outer edges of
the solicitation rules were established, but there was vast middle
ground that was uncertain, and would require future litigation to
resolve, some of which our office handled.45
42 Id. at 464.
43 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
44 id. at 439.
45 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (sustaining a rep-
rimand for attorney advertisements that were potentially misleading or that omitted contingent-
fee information, but finding that a reprimand imposed for giving legal advice which was neither
false nor deceptive violated the First Amendment); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993)
(holding that prohibition of CPA solicitation of clients in a business context violated the First
and Fourteenth Amendments).
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IV. REFLECTIONS
In less than six years from the inception of our work on the
prescription drug advertising case, the Court had abolished the old
rule on commercial speech and erected a new doctrine that would
be refined two years later in the Central Hudson case. It had rec-
ognized the value of commercial speech to those who want to re-
ceive it, including recognizing their right to sue under the First
Amendment when the government passed laws restricting access to
important information. The Court had also used the First Amend-
ment to strike down broad lawyer advertising restrictions that ex-
isted in every state, and it had made clear that at least some direct
solicitations could not be banned outright, although it upheld the
rule, at least as applied to inherently coercive activities. Our plan
had been to open up the legal profession to advertising and solici-
tation, but no one imagined that we could have come so far so fast.
Our plan, and in particular the order in which we decided to
proceed was important, but fortune was also on our side. The tim-
ing of Bigelow was exquisite, and no one could have expected
Bates and the two solicitation cases to come along so rapidly, let
alone present fact patterns that enabled the Court to make so large
a mark in the law of commercial speech for lawyers so rapidly.
Although not legally relevant to the First Amendment issues, the
antitrust ruling in Goldfarb also moved the Court's thinking to the
point where the commercial nature of bar activities was brought
into clearer focus, thus lessening the effect of the justifications
offered for continuing the broad prohibitions. Finally, it did not
hurt that these events played out following Watergate, when law-
yers were found to be at the heart of that terrible scandal, again
making it more difficult for the Court to sustain special treatment
for the bar.
I have no illusion that, even if we had never brought any of
these cases, others would not have successfully challenged these
rules at some time. But what would have happened if Bates did
not have Virginia Board of Pharmacy as a precedent? Despite
having ruled 8-1 that pharmacists could advertise drug prices,
there were still four Justices, including Chief Justice Burger, who
believed that lawyers could be barred from saying anything about
the availability of their services, no matter how truthful or useful
the information might be.46 In the end, the law on lawyer advertis-
ing and solicitation would probably have come to about the place it
46 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 773-74
(1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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is now, but who knows when that would have happened and by
what route.
From time to time, I have been asked, "are you pleased with
what you have done, and in particular, do you like seeing lawyers
hawking their services on late night television, as if they were sell-
ing knives, vacation time shares, used cars, or weight loss pro-
grams?" Do I wish that some lawyers had better taste? Of course.
But if the price of eliminating some unsavory ads were the return
to an age where consumers were kept in the dark about highly
relevant information that might help them choose the right lawyer
for their particular problem, then I can live with those objection-
able ads.
Finally, I have yet to come to grips with a problem more seri-
ous than bad taste-the advertising of tobacco products that addict
millions of young people each year and kill 400,000 Americans
annually. In the only First Amendment case in which the Court
has dealt with tobacco, Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,47 it found
the Massachusetts rules under attack there unconstitutionally
broad, to the extent that they were not already preempted by a fed-
eral statute. Fortunately, the tobacco industry, as a result of the
lawsuits brought by every state, agreed to end the most pernicious
of its practices directed at inducing minors to begin smoking, but
there are still too many advertisements aimed at impressionable
youth. The Court seems to be clear that it will not allow bans on
ads directed at adults, so long as cigarettes are legal, but there does
seem to be some room for laws that are narrowly tailored toward
ending promotion of tobacco that reaches young people who are
legally not entitled to buy them. But even if I am wrong, and even
if the First Amendment would not allow states to force the industry
to do what it has agreed to do to settle those lawsuits, I would
swallow hard and say, on balance I still prefer that result to what
came before 1972.
47 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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